We study the structure of optimal wealth and labor income taxes in a Mirrlees economy in which the productivity of labor (i.e., skill) is private, stochastic, and endogenous. Individual agents' skills are determined by their level of human capital. Human capital is not publicly observable and the returns to human capital investment are subject to idiosyncratic shocks. Preferences are not assumed to be additively separable in consumption and human capital investment and, thus, the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution of consumption are private information. We characterize the optimal allocation and a tax system that implements this allocation in equilibrium. The optimal allocation does not satisfy the "reciprocal Euler equation" of Rogerson [Econometrica, 1985], which holds in Mirrlees economies with exogenous skills. The tax system we use in our decentralization of the optimum consists of a wealth tax that is linear in wealth and a labor income tax that depends solely on labor income. The result of Kocherlakota [Econometrica, 2005], establishing the optimality of zero expected marginal wealth tax rate, holds in our model. We show that endogenous skill determination affects the volatility of marginal wealth taxes rather than their expectation. Relative to economies with exogenous skills, the optimal marginal wealth tax rate is more volatile in our endogenous skill economy. Also, we demonstrate the optimality of a wedge in the returns on the two assets present in our economy: At the optimum, the marginal return on human capital investment is strictly larger than the marginal return on physical capital investment.
Introduction
Recent literature obtains important results characterizing optimal capital and labor income taxes in dynamic Mirrlees economies.
1 In a Mirrlees economy, agents are affected by idiosyncractic, privately 1 observable shocks to the productivity of their labor effort. In the Mirrlees approach to optimal taxation, the role of the tax system is to fund government purchases and insure the productivity risk.
The optimal taxation problem is to characterize a tax system that fulfills this dual role efficiently, given the informational constraints imposed by the lack of public observability of the idiosyncractic productivity shocks. In a ground-breaking paper, Mirrlees (1971) solves the optimal taxation problem in a static setting. Taking all but the labor effort decisions as given, he characterizes optimal labor income taxes. The main limitation of the static approach is that it ignores the effect that taxes have on agents' investment decisions. The contribution of the recent literature is in the characterization of optimal tax systems in dynamic settings in which agents' physical capital investment decisions (i.e., savings) are endogenous.
Physical capital investment, however, is not the only important category of investment decision problems that agents face over the life cycle. There is ample evidence suggesting that human capital investment decisions are at least equally important.
2 By investing in their human capital, people affect profoundly their future skills, and, consequently, their wages, earnings and welfare. The existing literature on optimal taxation with endogenous savings, however, takes the evolution of agents' skills as exogenous and thus ignores the effect that taxes have on agents' human capital investment decisions. In this paper, we solve the optimal taxation problem in a simple dynamic setting in which both the physical capital and human capital investment decisions are endogenous. Introducing endogenous human capital into a two-period Mirrlees economy, we make two assumptions about the technology of human capital formation. First, we assume that agents' productivity in the second period depends on the amount of resources they devote to human capital accumulation in the first period. This assumption is standard in the human capital literature [see, e.g., Heckman (1976) , Boldrin and Montes (2005) ].
3 Second, we assume that the return on human capital investment is subject to stochastic idiosyncractic shocks. This assumption is well documented in empirical studies [see, e.g., Palacios-Huerta (2003) ]. The distribution of information in our model is as follows. Following the optimal taxation literature surveyed in Kocherlakota (2005a) , we take physical capital, output, and labor income as observable. As a basic feature of all Mirrlees economies, individual skills are agents' private information. Therefore, we assume that agents' human capital is not publicly observable. Finally, we need to make an assumption about the observability of human capital investment. We assume that it is not publicly observable how much resources an agent spends on human capital investment and how much on consumption and, therefore, both are private information of the agent.
The difficulty in distinguishing between human capital investment and consumption expenditures has been long recognized by academic economists. 4 It has also been recognized as a problem in the ongoing policy debate on how to design the tax system in order to foster human capital accumulation. 5 At the core of this measurement problem lies the fact that, in reality, there is a human 2 Some estimates put the value of human capital at 93% of all wealth in the US. See Palacios-Huerta (2003a) and references therein. 3 Many microeconomic studies also assume that effort is an input in the technology of human capital production. We do not include this input in our production function for clarity of exposition. Our results do not depend on this abstraction. 4 Theodore Schultz in his 1961 Presidential Address to the AEA stresses that "Much of what we call consumption constitutes investment in human capital." See Schultz, (1961 , 1961a and Shaffer (1961) for an extensive discussion, and Davies, Zeng and Zhang (2000) for a recent application. 5 A 2005 memorandum to the President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform on tax treatment of investment investment but remain separable in consumption and labor. The question of optimal taxation in a model with human capital accumulation has been addressed in many papers in the context of the so-called Ramsey approach to optimal taxation (see for example Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997) ). In this approach, the government is restricted to use linear taxes and this restriction is not derived from the fundamentals of the model. Our paper is different, as we use the Mirrlees approach. We specify explicitly an informational friction in the fundamentals of the model that endogenously constrains the set of tax instruments that the government can use. Kapicka (2005) is a related paper that studies taxation of human capital in a Mirrlees environment. This paper, however, imposes an exogenous restriction on the set of tax instruments that the government can use, and thus derives a tax system that is constrained-suboptimal. In addition, Kapicka (2005) disallows capital markets. In our paper, we allow both human and physical capital accumulation and derive a tax system that is optimal, relative to the informational frictions of our environment. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the environment. Section 3 provides a characterization of the optimal allocation. Section 4 provides a decentralization theorem and proves the zero average tax result. Section 5 shows the effect of endogenous human capital on the volatility of optimal capital taxes. Section 6 provides some numerical examples. Section 7 concludes.
Environment
Consider a two-date (t = 0, 1) economy populated by a continuum of ex ante identical agents. The size of the population is normalized to unity. There is a single consumption good at each date. In period 0 each agent is endowed with k 0 > 0 units of capital, which can be invested or consumed.
Preferences: Agents' preferences over stochastic streams of consumption c = (c 0 , c 1 ) and labor effort at t = 1, l, are given by
where u : R + → R is a strictly increasing, strictly concave C 2 function and v : R + → R is a strictly decreasing, strictly concave C 2 function such that v(0) = 0.
Technology: Using an available 1 to 1 technology, agents can transform the date-zero capital into consumption c 0 , date-one physical capital k 1 , or into a human capital investment good i. The human capital production technology is stochastic. A date-zero human capital investment of size i ≥ 0 produces the amount h of date-one human capital given by h = θi, where θ ∈ Θ ≡ {0, 1} is an i.i.d. across agents shock to human capital investment productivity. The probability of θ ∈ Θ is denoted by π(θ), with 0 < π(θ) < 1 for both θ ∈ Θ. Individual realizations of this shock are private. We assume that the exact Law of Large Numbers applies, so π(θ) also represents the fraction of agents whose shock realization is θ.
Human capital determines agents' productivity at date one. An agent whose human capital level is h and who works l units time provides y units of effective labor. The amount of y, as a function of h and l, is given by y = f (h)l, where f : R + → R + is a strictly increasing, strictly concave, differentiable, publicly known function 5 satisfying the Inada conditions:
Effective labor y is publicly observable. However, the individual amount invested i, stock of human capital h, and labor l are private information of each agent.
In period 1, the consumption good is produced according to an aggregate production function F : R + × R + → R + , which has aggregate physical capital K and aggregate effective labor Y as inputs. The amount of the consumption good produced at t = 1 from inputs K and Y is given by
We assume that Z is strictly increasing, strictly concave, publicly known, constant returns to scale, and C 2 . Also, we assume that Z satisfies the following Inada conditions:
where Z i denotes the first partial derivative of Z with respect to the i-th argument. The parameter δ ∈ [0, 1] is the depreciation rate of physical capital. Undepreciated capital is available for consumption at date t = 1. Information: Publicly observable are each agent's capital holdings k 0 , k 1 and effective labor y. Since there is no investment in human capital at time t = 1, period-1 consumption c 1 is also publicly known. Human capital investment i, consumption at time zero c 0 , the stock of human capital h, and the labor effort at time t = 1, l, are private.
Definition 1 A (type-identical) allocation in this economy is a collection (c, i, k 1 , l, K, Y ) where c = (c 0 , c 1 ) , with c 0 ∈ R + and c 1 : Θ → R + , denotes consumption, i ∈ R + denotes investment, k 1 ∈ R + is the physical capital held by an individual agent at t = 1, l : Θ → R + , is an individual agent's labor, K ∈ R + is the aggregate capital stock at t = 1, Y ∈ R + is the aggregate effective labor input at t = 1.
The condition (2) is the resource constraint of time t = 0 and the condition (3) is the resource constraint of time t = 1. G is government spending at time t = 1. Equations (4) and (5) are accounting identities.
where
Formally, an incentive compatible allocation is an outcome of an incentive compatible direct revelation mechanism. The interpretation is as follows. At t = 0, a social planner makes a recommendation about the choices of c 0 , i, and k 1 . At t = 1, agents observe their individual realizations of the human capital investment shock θ and reveal them to the planner. As a function of those revealed realizations, the planner makes effective labor and consumption assignments. Agents provide labor required and consume in amounts assigned by the planner. The presence of private information is a restriction on the set of allocations that can be chosen by the planner. Agents must be willing to (a) follow the planner's human capital investment recommendation at t = 0, and (b) truthfully reveal θ at t = 1. The function V in (7) gives the maximal utility that agents can attain by deviating from the planner's investment recommendation and/or lying about their realizations of θ. The IC constraint (6) requires the planner to use such allocations that agents do not have an incentive to deviate from the planner's recommendation or to lie about θ. By the Revelation Principle, the restriction of the set of allocations to the set outcomes of direct revelation mechanisms is without loss of generality.
The formula (9) is the ex post continuation value w(θ, i 0 ) of an agent who invested i 0 in human capital and whose θ = 0. This formula reflects the fact that the maximum continuation utility that can be achieved at t = 1 by an agent whose θ = 0 is the larger of the two utility values attained by the two ex post reporting/labor strategies available to the agent. One is to truthfully report θ = 0 and work l(0) hours, which yields utility u(c 1 (0)) + v(l(0)). The other is to pretend that θ = 1 and work
hours to provide the effective labor of the high-skilled equal to f (i)l(1) .
This latter strategy yields utility u(c
Note that when f (0) = 0 and f (i)l(1) > 0, agents whose θ = 0 cannot pretend to be high-skilled, as their skill level is zero. In this special case, therefore, l(0) = 0 at any efficient allocation, and (9) reduces to w(0, i 0 ) = u(c 1 (0)).
The expression (10) represents the ex post continuation value w(θ, i 0 ) of an agent who invested i 0 in human capital and whose θ = 1. Similar to the case of θ = 0, this continuation value is equal to the larger of the utility values attained by the two reporting/labor strategies available to the agent ex post. One is to pretend that θ = 0 and work
f (i 0 ) hours to provide the effective labor of the low-skilled f (0)l(0), which yields utility u(c
The other strategy is to truthfully 7 report θ = 1 and work
f (i 0 ) hours to provide the effective labor of the high-skilled, which leads to utility u(c
Note that under either strategy the disutility of labor of an agent whose θ = 1 depends on the amount i 0 invested at t = 0. Because this amount is private, human capital investment is a hidden state variable and thus there is no common knowledge of preferences over continuation contracts in our model.
Definition 4 An allocation (c, i, k 1 , l, K, Y ) is incentive feasible if it is incentive compatible and feasible.
Definition 5 An allocation (c, i, k, l, K, Y ) is constrained optimal if it is incentive feasible and if it maximizes, in the class of all incentive feasible allocations, the ex ante expected utility of the representative agent.
By Definition 5, an allocation is constrained optimal, if it is a solution to the social planner's problem defined as follows:
s.t. (RF ), (IC).
Due to strict concavity of preferences, there is a unique constrained optimal allocation in this economy. Due to the assumed Inada conditions, the optimum is interior. We denote the constrained optimal allocation by (c
and refer to it simply as the optimal allocation, or the optimum.
Characterization of the optimal allocation
In this section, we provide a characterization of the optimal allocation. In the first subsection, by identifying and disregarding the non-binding IC constraints, we reduce the complicated IC constraints of Definition 3 to a single equality constraint. We proceed in two steps. First, in Lemma 1, we simplify the IC conditions of Definition 3 without relaxing them. This allows us to rewrite the social planner's problem P1 in an equivalent form in which the IC conditions are reduced to two inequalities and one equality constraint. Then, in Lemma 2, we show that only one of those constraints binds at the optimal allocation. This constraint turns out to be the IC constraint that restricts the set of allocations available to the planner to such allocations at which agents cannot benefit from a joint deviation of under-investing in human capital ex ante and shirking ex post.
In the second subsection, we turn to the properties of the optimal allocation. The most significant feature of the optimal allocation is the fact that the so-called reciprocal intertemporal first order condition of Rogerson (1985) , Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003) , and Kocherlakota (2005) does not hold at the optimum. Instead, Propositions 1 and 2 provide two "modified Rogerson" conditions that characterize our optimal allocation. As a corollary, we obtain that it is optimal for the marginal return on human capital investment to exceed the marginal return on physical capital investment.
Simplifying the IC constrains
Lemma 1 An allocation (c, i, k 1 , l, K, Y ) is incentive compatible if and only if
and
where e i solves the following equation
Proof In Appendix.
Condition (11) is the ex post incentive compatibility requirement for agents whose investment shock θ is realized at zero. It guarantees that low-skilled agents cannot benefit from over-reporting their skill by declaring that their θ is equal to one. Condition (12) is the first order condition from the agents' optimal deviation problem. It ensures that agents find it optimal ex ante to invest in human capital the amount recommended by the planner, i, given that they plan to truthfully announce their realization of the shock θ ex post. The role of condition (13) is to ensure that agents indeed do find it optimal to truthfully reveal their θ. This condition guarantees that utility provided to an agent who makes the recommended investment ex ante and truthfully reveals his type ex post (i.e., his realization of θ) is at least as large as the level of utility that this agent can attain by making the following joint (i.e., two-dimensional) deviation from truth-telling: lie ex post about the realization of the investment shock if θ = 1 and deviate ex ante from the recommended human capital investment level i to the level of investment that maximizes the utility value of this deviation strategy. This deviation's optimal level of human capital investment is denoted by e i. The value of e i is given implicitly by equation (14) .
Note that the ex post IC constraint for the high-skilled,
which guarantees that the high-skilled weakly prefer to report their type truthfully, does not show up in Lemma 1. This constraint is important in Mirrlees economies with exogenous skills because it binds in these environments. In our environment, this constraint does not play any role because the IC condition (13) is a tighter constraint than (15). In particular, at the optimum, (15) holds as a strict inequality. Intuitively, since (13) discourages the joint deviation of shirking and optimally deviating from the recommended investment level i, the one-dimensional deviation of just shirking is also eliminated by (13).
Lemma 1 shows that conditions (11), (12) and (13) are necessary and sufficient for incentive compatibility of an allocation. This lemma is useful because it simplifies the IC constraints. In particular, it replaces the IC conditions of Definition 3, which involve maximization problems, with two inequalities and one equality condition.
By Lemma 1, we can equivalently express the social planner's problem P1 as the problem of maximization of ex ante expected utility (1) subject to the resource feasibility constraints (RF) and the incentive compatibility constraints given by (11), (12) and (13). We thus define the following:
Problem P2 (11), (12), (13).
Problems P1 and P2 are equivalent, i.e., have the same objective and the same constraint set. The optimal allocation, therefore is given as the solution to problem P2. We characterize the optimum by studying problem P2. Lemma 2 below demonstrates that, in problem P2, the ex ante incentive constraint (13) is the only IC constraint that binds.
Lemma 2 In problem P2, the constraint (13) binds, and the constraints (11) and (12) are nonbinding.
Proof In Appendix. Lemma 2 shows that the deviation strategy of shirking ex post and investing e i instead of i ex ante is in fact the best deviation strategy available to the agents in this model. This strategy generates the binding constraint (13). Lemma 2 shows that the ex post IC constraint for the lowskilled, (11), is slack at the optimum. This slackness is a standard feature of Mirrleesian models. Lemma 2 also demonstrates that the constraint (12) is not binding at the optimum. This is intuitive. Condition (12) guarantees that agents find it optimal to follow the planer's recommended human capital investment i, given that they do not plan to misrepresent ex post the realized value of the investment shock θ. But in this case, i.e., when ex post incentives are taken care of, the planner and an agent who considers a deviation from i maximize the same, undistorted by ex post misrepresentations, expected utility. Therefore, the same value of i maximizes both the planner's and the agent's objective and, in effect, (12) is always satisfied at the solution to P2, and it never binds in this problem.
To summarize, we have shown in Lemma 1 that the optimal allocation is a solution to problem P2. Lemmas 2 demonstrates that constraints (11) and (12) do not bind while (13) does bind in P2. Therefore, the optimal allocation is a solution to the problem of maximization of ex ante expected utility (1) subject to the resource feasibility constraints and a single IC equality constraint, namely, the ex ante incentive compatibility constraint (13) satisfied as equality.
The first order (FO) conditions of this problem together with the RF constraints and the binding IC condition completely determine the optimal allocation. In the next subsection, we use these conditions to demonstrate some properties of the optimal allocation.
Properties of the optimal allocation
Directly from the FO conditions of the planner's problem, we obtain some of the usual properties that optimal allocations possess in private information Mirrlees economies with exogenous skills:
where K * and Y * denote the optimal aggregate physical capital K, and aggregate effective labor Y , respectively.
Inequalities (16) and (17) show that the optimal allocation features less than full consumption insurance and a larger effective labor assignment to the more productive agents. Also, (18) shows the optimality of the so-called intratemporal wedge between the low-skilled type's marginal utility of an additional unit of consumption and this type's marginal cost of producing this additional unit.
As (19) indicates, no such wedge is optimal for the high-skilled (no distortion at the top).
Another important property of optimal allocations in Mirrlees economies is the so-called reciprocal or inverse Euler condition. This condition was derived by Rogerson (1985) in a repeated moral hazard model and extended by Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003) and Kocherlakota (2005) to a large class of dynamic Mirrlees environments in which agents' IMRS are public. Adapted to the notation of our model, the Rogerson condition is given as follows:
where r denotes the marginal return on physical capital investment, i.e.,
Proposition 1 below demonstrates that in our environment the optimal allocation does not satisfy the Rogerson's reciprocal Euler equation. Instead, it does satisfy an analog of this condition, which we term "modified Rogerson condition".
A simple but important property of the optimal allocation follows from (12), (14) and (17):
Inequality (23) shows that, at the optimum, agents' best deviation strategy involves an underinvestment in human capital and over-consumption at t = 0. This fact has significant implications for the structure of the optimal allocation. Using (23) and (16), we get that the term subtracted on the right-hand side of (21) is strictly positive. Therefore, our modified Rogerson equation (21) implies that
which demonstrates that the optimal allocation of our environment does not satisfy the Rogerson condition (20). It follows from (24), combined with the Jensen inequality, that, similar to Mirrlees economies with exogenous skills, the so-called intertemporal wedge is optimal in our environment:
In a sense to be made precise in Section 5, this wedge is larger in our endogenous skill environment than in standard Mirrlees environments with exogenous skills. We show in Section 5 that this larger intertemporal wedge translates into a larger volatility of marginal capital tax rates. In order to explain the difference between the usual Rogerson condition (20) of the standard Mirrlees model and the modified Rogerson condition (21) of our model, we first provide a variational argument for and present the intuition behind the usual Rogerson equation (20). Then we extend this argument and intuition to our model. To this end, suppose, in the context of our model, that human capital investment i is publicly observable, which in terms of incentives is equivalent to the standard Mirrlees economy in which skills are given exogenously. Since the initial capital endowment k 0 , and physical capital investment k 1 are observable, consumption c 0 can be now perfectly inferred from k 0 and the observations of k 1 and i. Thus, the IC constraints of Lemma 1 reduce to the following two ex post IC constraints:
We know from the standard Mirrlees model that the first of those constraints is slack at the optimum. Let us then disregard it for the purpose of this discussion. The incentive problem in this environment is to discourage the high-skilled from pretending to be low-skilled (all agents make the recommended human capital investment i because this investment is now observable and any deviation can be severely punished). The deviation strategy that makes (26) bind in the planner's problem of this environment consists of declaring the low realization of the investment shock θ when it really is high, which results in the low effective labor assignment f (0)l(0) in place of the high assignment f (i)l(1) (shirking). This strategy provides the deviator with the total ex ante utility of
while the truth-teller's utility is equal to
The IC condition (26) is satisfied if and only if
Take now an incentive compatible and resource feasible allocation (c, i, k 1 , l, K, Y ) and consider a small re-allocation of consumption between date 0 and date 1 via a change in physical capital investment dk 1 . For concreteness, take dk 1 > 0. This investment hike reduces the date 0 consumption c 0 by dk 1 and makes extra resources available at date 1 in the amount of rdk 1 . The magnitude of the change in the social welfare that results from this small increase in physical capital investment depends in general on how those extra resources available at date 1 are distributed among the two ex post types of agents. The key point here is that this distribution has to preserve incentives. Since the initial allocation (c, i, k 1 , l, K, Y ) is incentive compatible, incentives will be preserved if the gain in the utility of the deviator, v dev , is not larger than the gain in the utility of the truth-teller,
The cut in the ex ante consumption c 0 affects the values of the deviation strategy and the truth-telling strategy identically: the values of both strategies are decreased by u 0 (c 0 )dk 1 . The ex post consumption utility gains of the two strategies, however, depend on how the extra resources are split between those who declare θ = 0 and those who declare θ = 1. In the relevant case of less than full insurance of the consumption risk, we have u 0 (c 1 (0)) > u 0 (c 1 (1)) and thus the gain in the social welfare would be maximized if a larger part of rdk 1 were allocated to those who declare θ = 0. This, however, would in general violate incentives by giving a larger gain in the utility of consumption at date 1 to the deviator, as the deviator always declares θ = 0. Therefore, the best that the planner can do ex post is to distribute the resources rdk 1 in such a way that the gain in the ex post utility of consumption is the same for all values of θ. Denoting the amount allocated to those who declare θ by ρ(θ), we therefore need to have
with the same 4 for all θ, and with
Note that ρ is low when marginal utility of consumption is high, which is inefficient in the "firstbest" sense. The total gain in the ex ante expected utility, under truth-telling, that results from this distribution of the surplus is equal to
Substituting (27) into (28) and solving for 4, we get
Adding up the loss due to decreased consumption at date 0 and the gain due to increased consumption at date 1, we get that the total change in the ex ante expected utility, under truth-telling (i.e., on the equilibrium path), is given by
If the initial allocation (c, i, k 1 , l, K, Y ) is optimal, the above expression has to be equal zero for all dk 1 , which happens only if the expression in the bracket is zero, which yields the Rogerson condition (20).
Let us now return to our environment, in which human capital investment i and consumption c 0 are indistinguishable to the planner, and thus private information of the agent. A reexamination of the foregoing variational argument shows why the Rogerson condition (20) does not characterize the optimum in our environment. We know from Lemma 2 that the only IC constraint that binds in the planner's problem P2 is the constraint (13). The incentive problem in our environment, then, is to discourage the agents from doing a joint deviation of under-investing in human capital ex ante and shirking ex post. At this deviation strategy, the deviator invests e i < i and shirks. A key difference between the best deviation strategy in the observable (or exogenous) human capital investment model and our model with private human capital investment is that date-zero consumption of the deviator is not equal to the date zero consumption of the truth-teller in our model. The value of the deviation strategy in our private human capital investment model is
where e i is given as a solution to (14). The utility of an agent who follows the planner's recommendation at both dates is equal to
The IC condition (13) is satisfied if and only if v tt ≥ v dev .
As before, take now an incentive compatible and resource feasible allocation (c, i, k 1 , l, K, Y ) and consider a small hike in the physical capital investment dk 1 funded by a cut in date-0 recommended consumption c 0 . Unlike in the previous case of observable human capital investment, the values of the deviation strategy v dev and the equilibrium strategy v tt are affected differently by this cut in c 0 . The deviator is less hurt by the cut in c 0 than the on-equilibrium agent because the deviator's date-0 consumption c 0 + i − e i is strictly larger than the on-equilibrium date-0 consumption c 0 , and u is concave. This is why the Rogerson equation does not hold at the optimum of the private human capital investment model. Ex post, the planner cannot use the same distribution of the resource surplus that was used in the observable investment model, i.e., the distribution ρ that gives the same gain in date-1 consumption utility to both the deviator and the on-equilibrium agent. This distribution would make the deviation strategy more attractive relative to the on-equilibrium strategy. If the utility of the deviator at date 1 were to increase by as much as the utility of the on-equilibrium agent, given that the deviator loses less utility at date 0, the overall value of the deviation strategy would increase, relative to the equilibrium strategy, which would in general violate incentives. In order to preserve incentives, therefore, the planner has to use at date-1 a distribution of the surplus that strictly favors the on-equilibrium agent over the deviator. This advantage has to be just large enough to offset the deviator's advantage that results from the equal cut in the date-0 consumption of the deviator and the on-equilibrium agent. In order to do so, this distribution of the surplus has to give even more resources to those agents who announce θ = 1 ex post, as the deviator always announces θ = 0. Thus, on the equilibrium path, this distribution is even more inefficient, relative to the first best, than the distribution ρ of the model with observable investment. Denote by η(θ) the amount by which the planner increases consumption of the agent who declares θ at data 1. In order to maintain incentives, η must be such that the overall change in v dev is the same as the overall change in v tt , i.e.,
Using (29) and P θ∈Θ π(θ)η(θ) = rdk 1 to eliminate η from (30), with a little bit of algebra, we get that the total change in the utility of the on-equilibrium agent is given by ⎛
If the initial allocation (c, i, k 1 , l, K, Y ) is optimal, the above expression has to equal zero for all dk 1 , which means that the expression that multiplies dk 1 has to be zero, which yields the modified Rogerson equation (21). Intuitively, as the deviation opportunities for the agents are richer in the environment with private human capital investment, the incentive cost of physical capital investment, measured by the dispersion of the ex post distribution of the return, is larger. This leads to the modified Rogerson equation (21) and inequality (24).
In the existing literature on dynamic optimal taxation, physical capital is the only asset that the planner can use to transfer resources between two points in time. In the environment we study in this paper, the planner can alternatively use human capital as an indirect vehicle for moving consumption between dates 0 and 1.
Let us denote by R the human capital investment's marginal return π(1)f
Proposition 2 below derives a version of the modified Rogerson equation that applies to this return at the optimum.
Proposition 2 At the optimal allocation (c
where, as before, α is given in (22).
The reason for the difference between the modified Rogerson equation for physical capital investment (21) and human capital investment (31) can be seen from the variational argument we have discussed before. If the planner increases physical capital investment by dk 1 and decreases the recommended consumption c 0 by the same amount, then, as we discuss above, the date-0 utility of an agent who follows the best deviation strategy decreases by −u
which is less than u 0 (c 0 )dk 1 but more than 0. If, in turn, the planner increases human capital investment by di and decreases the recommended consumption c 0 by the same amount, the date-0 consumption of the agent who follows the deviation strategy does not drop at all. To see this note that the date-0 utility of the deviating agent decreases by −u
Thus, a marginal increase in the recommended human capital investment increases the value of the deviation strategy even more rapidly than a marginal increase in the physical capital investment does. In order to compensate for it, the planner has to split the date-1 return on this investment, Rdi, with an even larger bias, relative to the distribution η, toward those agents who announce θ = 1, which decreases the social value of human capital investment. This additional relative inefficiency of the best incentive feasible distribution of the return on human capital investment makes the social return on a unit of human capital investment lower than the social return on a unit of physical capital investment. At the optimum, the social rates of return on those two assets have to be equal. This means that the physical rate of return on the human capital investment, R, must exceed the physical rate of return on physical capital investment, r, at the optimum. This fact is highlighted in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 At the optimal allocation (c
Proof Follows directly from (21) and (31). The inequality (32) establishes the optimality of a wedge between the marginal rates of return to physical and human capital investment. We will refer to this wedge as the asset return wedge. In Section 6, we study numerically the properties of this wedge.
Decentralization
Following the Mirrlees approach to optimal taxation, we study the question of decentralization of the optimal allocation in an equilibrium with taxes, in which the only constraints on the set of tax instruments available to the government are imposed by the informational frictions primitive to the economic environment studied. 6 In general, many such decentralizations are possible. Following
Kocherlakota (2005), we confine our attention to decentralizations in which the tax on capital is linear in capital and labor taxes depend solely on labor income. In Proposition 3, we show the existence of such a decentralization and provide a complete characterization of the optimal tax system. In Proposition 4, we show that, as in Kocherlakota (2005) , the expected value of the marginal capital tax rate is zero. It follows that government's revenue from capital taxation is optimally equal to zero. The proof of this result given in Kocherlakota (2005) relies on the fact that the optimal allocation of his environment satisfies a generalized version of the first-order condition of Rogerson (1985) . By Proposition 1, the Rogerson condition does not hold in our environment. Thus, the existence of a decentralization with linear capital taxes and the zero average tax result that we obtain are a generalization of the results of Kocherlakota beyond the class of economies in which the IMRS are public and the Rogerson condition holds.
Equilibrium
We now introduce a set of markets in which agents trade taking prices and taxes as given. There is spot trade at the ex post date. Consumption, human capital investment, and savings decisions are made ex ante. Agents save by accumulating physical capital, i.e., there are no finanical assets. Our results on optimal taxes do not depend on this restriction. As in Kocherlakota (2005) , the introduction of a bond into our model would not change anything as long as all wealth receives the same tax treatment.
There is a single representative firm that operates the technology of production ex post. Due to free entry and constant returns to scale, the single-firm assumption is without a loss of generality. The firm employs physical capital and effective labor at prices r and w, respectively. The firm takes these prices as given. In equilibrium, inputs are paid their marginal product.
At the ex ante date, agents decide how to allocate their initial endowment of capital k 0 between consumption c 0 , physical capital investment k 1 , and human capital investment i. At the ex post date, agents supply their capital k 1 and effective labor y = f (θi)l(θ) to the firm.
Publicly observable are capital holdings k 1 and effective labor y. Since there is no investment in human capital at time t = 1, the value of private consumption c 1 can be inferred from the observables. Human capital investment i and consumption c 0 , the stock of human capital h = f (θi), and the amount worked l(θ) are private.
We follow Kocherlakota (2005) in restricting attention to tax systems consisting of a linear tax e τ on capital and a possibly non-linear tax on effective labor e φ. Formally, the tax system consists of two functions e τ (y) and e φ(y), where e τ is the marginal capital tax rate, and e φ is the amount of the labor income tax. Both the labor tax and the marginal capital tax rate are functions of the observable effective labor provided by the agent, which makes this tax system linear in the physical capital holdings k 1 .
Definition 6 Given a tax system (e τ , e φ), a competitive equilibrium is an allocation of the consumption good, physical capital, investment in human capital and labor input for the agent (c e , k e 1 , i e , l e ), aggregate capital stock and effective labor input (K e , Y e ), and prices (r, w) such that 1. given taxes (e τ , e φ) and prices (r, w), (c e , k e 1 , i e , l e ) solves
2. prices (r, w) are given by
markets clear
In the above definition, the budget constraints in the agents' problem incorporate effective-labordependent taxes. The marginal factor pricing equations are equivalent to firm profit maximization under perfect competition in the production sector with constant returns to scale. Since profits must be zero at any equilibrium, we do not need to specify the ownership of the firm. The agent's budget constraints and the market clearing conditions imply that the government budget is balanced.
Equilibrium with a simplified tax system
As we allow the tax schedule to be an arbitrary function of effective labor, it can be chosen such that it effectively limits the choice of the effective labor by the agent to {f (0)l
the optimal allocation, effective labor of agents whose productivity shock is θ = 0 is y = f (0)l * (0), and effective labor provided by agents whose productivity shock is θ = 1 is y = f (i * )l * (1). The tax system is to be designed so as to implement this behavior in equilibrium. It is then easy to discourage all kinds of behavior inconsistent with the optimal allocation and such that the effective labor levels are different from f (0)l * (0) or f (i * )l * (1). Namely, if the observed effective labor y / ∈ {f (0)l * (0), f(i * )l * (1)}, then the punishment the tax code inflict upon the agent can be arbitrarily severe. For example, we can set the tax rate at 100% on both labor income and capital. Therefore, we setφ
for y / ∈ {f (0)l
The problem of the choice of taxes for y ∈ {f (0)l
, it is not publicly known if this is due to a low productivity shock θ = 0 or different than recommended choice of investment i and labor l. If the observed effective labor y = f (θi)l(θ) is equal to f (i * )l * (1), then, again, it is not publicly known if this is due to a high productivity shock θ = 1 or different than recommended choice of investment and labor. Taxes e φ(y) and e τ (y) for y ∈ {f (0)l * (0), f(i * )l * (1)} must be set so as to induce agents to invest the optimal amount i * and provide labor l * (0) ex post if θ = 0 and l * (1) ex post if θ = 1. In what follows, we introduce the following notation:
where φ(θ) and τ (θ) are, respectively, the labor income and capital tax for agents whose observed effective labor is consistent with optimal behavior, given the shock realization of θ. The simplified tax schedule, therefore, consists of four numbers φ(0), φ(1), τ (0), τ (1), with taxes for y / ∈ {f (0)l * (0), f(i * )l * (1)} given in (33) and (34).
Let us now examine the agent's utility maximization problem under the simplified tax system. At t = 0, agents choose c 0 , i, and k 1 subject to the budget constraint c 0 + i + k 1 ≤ k 0 . At t = 1, agents rent their capital to the firm and choose their labor l(θ). If, given i chosen at t = 0 and θ realized at the beginning of period t = 2, the choice of labor l(θ) is such that f (θi)l(θ) / ∈ {f (0)l
then labor income and capital taxes are 100%, which leads to zero consumption. No such choice can be optimal for the agent. Effectively, then, given i and θ, the choice of labor l(θ) is restricted to such values that effective labor f (θi)l(θ) belongs to {f (0)l
f (θi) . In the first case, taxes due are given by τ (0)rk 1 and φ(0). In the second case, taxes due are given by τ (1)rk 1 and φ(1).
To write the agent's problem under this simplified tax system formally, we define a choice variable s(θ) ∈ {0, 1} that indicates the choice to provide the high amount of effective labor, f (i * )l * (1), conditional on θ. I.e., s(θ) = 1 represents the decision to provide f (i * )l * (1) units of effective labor in state θ, and the choice s(θ) = 0 represents the decision to provide f (0)l * (0) units of effective labor in state θ. Using this notation, we can express agents' utility maximization problem under a simplified tax system φ, τ as follows. Given taxes (τ , φ) and prices (r, w), agents solve
Note in the above problem that the choices of i and s(θ) determine the level of labor l(θ), so l(θ) is not formally included as a choice variable. The definition of competitive equilibrium under simplified taxes (τ , φ) is identical to Definition 6, but agents' utility maximization problem is replaced by the above-defined agents' problem with simplified taxes.
Optimal taxes
Definition 7 A tax system is optimal if, under this system, there exists a competitive equilibrium such that the equilibrium allocation (c e , k e 1 , i e , l e , K e , Y e ) coincides with the optimal allocation
Proposition 3 establishes the existence of an optimal simplified tax system.
Proposition 3 In the class of simplified tax systems with linear capital taxes, there exists an optimal tax system. In particular, the following simplified tax system (τ * , φ * ) is optimal:
and where e i * is the value of i that solves
Proof In Appendix. The proof of this proposition is constructive. We show that with capital and labor prices (r, w) = (r * , w * ) and with taxes (τ * , φ * ) given in (37)-(39), agents choose the optimal allocation in equilibrium. The proof amounts to checking that the optimal allocation satisfies the equilibrium conditions of Definition 6. Market clearing and competitive pricing conditions are immediate. The main part of the proof shows that agents' equilibrium choices of effective labor, consumption, human and physical capital investment are consistent with the optimal allocation. Essentially, our model in which agents trade in a set of markets subject to prices and taxes constitutes a mechanism in the sense of mechanism design theory. The optimal allocation is an equilibrium outcome of a different mechanism, the direct revelation mechanism. Our decentralization exercise amounts to checking that, in the class of environments studied, there exists an equilibrium outcome of our market/tax mechanism that coincides with the desired equilibrium outcome of the direct revelation mechanism, i.e., the optimal allocation.
Following Kocherlakota (2005) , in our market/tax mechanism we use taxes that are arbitrarily nonlinear in effective labor and set them at 100% of all wealth if an agent's observed effective labor does not equal to effective labor assigned at the optimum to some type of agent. As in Kocherlakota, this guarantees that, in the market/tax equilibrium, agents whose type is θ choose to supply effective labor in an amount that in the optimal allocation is assigned to an agent whose type isθ. The last, and most important, step of the proof involves showing that indeedθ = θ, and that, conditional on this choice of effective labor in a market/tax equilibrium, the choices of consumption, human and physical capital investment are consistent with the optimal allocation. In Kocherlakota's (2005) environment, this last step of the proof is broken into two sub-steps. First, Kocherlakota uses the Rogerson equation, which holds in his environment with public IMRS, to show that conditional on the effective labor choice of typeθ, the agents' choices of the remaining decision variables in the market/tax mechanism coincide with the values that those variables are assigned in the direct revelation mechanism to an agent who declares to be of typeθ. I.e., if an agent chooses in the market/tax equilibrium of Kocherlakota to provide effective labor that in the direct revelation equilibrium is assigned to an agent who declares to be of typeθ, then this agent will also choose in the market/tax equilibrium the same path of capital accumulation and consumption that the planner assigns at the optimal allocation to an agent who declares to be of typeθ. Therefore, for any effective labor strategyθ, the utility that an agent attains in the market/tax equilibrium is equal to the utility that the optimal allocation provides to an agent who declares typeθ. Using this type-by-type equality of utility provided to agents in the two mechanisms, the second sub-step of Kocherlakota's proof simply invokes incentive compatibility of the optimal allocation to demonstrate that, in the equilibrium of the market/tax mechanism, agents of type θ choose the effective labor, and therefore the rest of the allocation too, that is socially optimal for an agent of type θ, which completes the proof.
Our proof of Proposition 3 follows Kocherlakota's proof of decentralization with one important difference. The last step of our proof cannot be split into the two sub-steps that Kocherlakota uses. In particular, it is not true in our model that in the market/tax equilibrium consumption and investment choices of an agent who provides effective labor optimal for typeθ coincide with the consumption and investment levels that are assigned to typeθ at the optimal allocation. Under taxes (τ * , φ * ) given in (37)-(39) and prices (r * , w * ), some off-equilibrium joint effective labor, consumption and investment deviation strategies attain utility levels strictly higher than the utility levels that those same off-equilibrium effective labor strategies attain in the direct revelation equilibrium, i.e., at the optimal allocation. Therefore, the incentive compatibility of the optimal allocation in itself does not guarantee, in general, the incentive compatability of the optimal allocation in the market/tax mechanism. Despite that, in our environment, we are able to prove that the values attained by those joint deviations do not exceed the value of the optimum. The optimal taxes (τ * , φ * ) are chosen in our model so as to ensure that the logic of Kocherlakota's proof applies to the truth-telling effective labor strategy and the off-equilibrium effective labor strategy for which the IC constraint binds in the planner's problem. I.e., taxes are chosen in such a way that, conditionally on those effective labor strategies, agents' market/tax equilibrium consumption and investment choices do coincide with the quantities optimally assigned by the planner. The other effective labor deviation strategies do not bind in the planner's problem, so the utility levels they provide are strictly less than the utility of the truth-telling strategy in the direct revelation mechanism. In our market/tax mechanism, by simultaneously adjusting consumption and investment decisions, agents are able to increase the utility values attained by these effective labor strategies above the levels that these strategies provide in the direct revelation mechanism, and thus Kocherlakota's proof does not apply. It turns out however that, for any such off-equilibrium effective labor strategy, the gain in utility produced by the joint deviation of investment and consumption is strictly less than the amount by which the utility of truth-telling exceeds the utility of this particular effective labor strategy in the direct revelation mechanism. Thus, although these off-equilibrium strategies do strictly better under the market/tax mechanism than under the direct revelation mechanism, the improvement is never sufficient to exceed the value the effective labor strategy associated with truth-telling and, thus, the market/tax mechanism, under taxes (τ * , φ * ) in (37)- (39), remains incentive compatible.
In our model, we use the same market/tax mechanism with linear capital taxes that is used in Kocherlakota (2005) . In the model of Kocherlakota (2005) , however, any off-equilibrium strategy generates the same utility both in the market/tax mechanism and in the direct revelation mechanism. In our model, some off-equilibrium strategies are strictly more attractive in the market/tax mechanism relative to the direct revelation mechanism. Therefore, the linear capital tax mechanism in our environment is a significantly stronger relaxation of the direct revelation mechanism than it is in the environment studied in Kocherlakota (2005) . The fact that this mechanism continues to work as a decentralization of the optimum in our model demonstrates robustness of the linear capital tax mechanism.
Proposition 4 below shows that Kocherlakota's zero expected wealth tax result continues to hold, despite the fact that the Rogerson condition does not hold in our environment.
Proposition 4 At the optimal tax system (τ * , φ * ),
Proof In Appendix. Proposition 4 shows that the zero expected optimal wealth tax result of Kocherlakota (2005) extends beyond the class of environments in which intertemporal marginal rates of substitution are private and individual optimal consumption allocation satisfies the Rogerson condition. Kocherlakota's proof of the zero expected tax result works off the Rogerson condition. Also, Farhi and Werning (2005) obtain the optimality of strictly positive expected wealth taxes in an environment in which the Rogerson condition does not hold. We use our modified Rogerson condition (21) to show that excepted marginal tax rate is zero in our model. Unlike in Kocherlakota's decentralization, however, it is not true in our model that agents' conditional after-tax marginal rates of substitution are independent of idiosyncratic uncertainty and equal to the social discount factor. To see this, note that
where the inequality follows from the fact that i * > e i * . Of course, we have
because we decentralize the optimal allocation, and thus equilibrium pricing of physical capital must be consistent with the socially optimal valuation. In Kocherlakota's decentralization, however, the after-tax marginal rate of substitution
) is equal to the social discount factor 1/r * for all θ. In our decentralization, as (40) demonstrates, the after-tax marginal rate of substitution varies with θ. In particular,
. Also, similar to Kocherlakota (2005) , the marginal tax rate on capital is strictly positive for agents whose productivity is low and strictly negative for those whose productivity is high. The high wealth tax rate on the low skilled is needed so as to deter agents from making a joint deviation of under-investing in human capital, over-saving, and providing low effective labor independently of the realization of θ. This need to deter shirking is also present in the exogenous skill environment of Kocherlakota (2005) . There, however, the joint deviation has only two dimensions. It consists of over-saving and providing low effective labor for any realization of the productivity shock. In our environment in which skills are endogenous, the double deviation of Kocherlakota turns into a triple deviation, with under-investment in human capital being the third dimension.
Volatility of optimal wealth taxes: endogenous versus exogenous skills
In this section, we show that skill endogenity leads to more volatility of marginal capital tax rates. More precisely, we show that it takes more volatility of marginal capital tax rates to decentralize a given consumption allocation in our environment with endogenous skills than in an exogenous-skill version of our model. If skills were given exogenously, our model would be a special case of the model of Kocherlakota (2005) . Then, the optimal marginal capital tax rates, as derived in Kocherlakota (2005) , would be as follows
for θ ∈ Θ, where hats over τ , c 0 , c 1 and r indicate that these values of taxes, consumption, and the rental rate are optimal in the model with exogenous skills. Also, it follows from Kocherlakota (2005) that, with exogenous skills, the optimal consumption and rental rate satisfy the usual Rogerson condition
Proposition 5 Take an endogenous-skill economy and an exogenous-skill Mirrlees economy with the same preferences over consumption. Suppose that the same consumption allocation is optimal in both economies, i.e., (ĉ 0 ,ĉ 1 ) = (c * 0 , c * 1 ). Then,
Proof In Appendix. It is known from the work of Albanesi and Sleet (2005) and Kocherlakota (2005) that, in a market/tax decentralization of the optimum, the intertemporal wedge is implemented through the negative covariance of the marginal utility of consumption and the after-tax return on capital investment. From the point of view of an individual agent, this negative covariance makes savings a risky investment. This risk discourages agents from over-saving, which implements the intertemporal wedge.
The proof of Proposition 5 follows from the fact that the incentive problem is more severe in the environment with endogenous skills, which creates a larger social cost of physical capital investment. At a given optimal allocation, this larger cost must be offset by a larger rate of return, which implies that r * >r. This difference in the optimal returns implies a larger intertemporal wedge in the model with endogenous skills. To see this, note that at a given optimal allocation (ĉ 0 ,ĉ 1 ) = (c * 0 , c * 1 ), the difference in the two wedges is proportional to the difference in the optimal rates of return on capital:
As the expected optimal marginal capital taxes are zero in both the endogenous and exogenous skill models, the implementation of a larger wedge requires more risk in the after-tax return on savings, i.e., more volatility of the marginal capital tax rate τ .
Numerical examples
In this section, we study numerically how the asset wedge depends on the degree of risk aversion of the agents, and how private information affects the optimal allocation, wedges, and taxes.
Asset Wedge
In this subsection, we study numerically the relationship between the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the asset retur wedge expressed as the ratio of the optimal marginal return to human capital investment to the optimal marginal return to physical capital investment. We set β = 0.9; u(c) =
K with A = 3, α = 0.4 and δ = 0.5; π(θ = 0) = π(θ = 1) = 1/2; G = 0.1; k 0 = 1. Table 1 presents the relationship between the coefficient of relative risk aversion (σ) and the asset return wedge (R/r) implied by the optimal allocation under the above choice of the parameters' values. As we observe, the asset wedge increases with the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Intuitively, when the agents become more risk averse, the incentive problem is more severe, which results in an increase of the incentive cost of human capital investment relative to the incentive cost of physical capital investment. This translates into a larger wedge between marginal returns of these assets.
The Role of Private Information
In this subsection, we study the quantitative differences between our model, the public human capital investment model, and the model with no private information. The three economies we compare have the same preferences, technology, and endowments. The only difference between them is the degree of private information present.
First, we compute the optimal allocation (c
, the intertemporal wedge, the asset return wedge, optimal wealth and labor taxes (τ * , φ * ) and the implied interest and wage rates (r * , w * ) in our economy with private human capital investment and private skills. Second, we modify our environment by assuming that the agent's human capital investment is public (and thus so is consumption), and then we compute the allocation and the tax code that are optimal in this public human capital investment economy. Finally, we modify our environment by assuming that both the agent's human capital investment and the productivity of this investment are public (and thus so is the agent's skill). Then we compute the allocation and tax code that are optimal in such a full information economy.
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We take β = 0.9; u(c) = log(c); Table 2 presents the optimal allocation, the implied gross interest rate on capital, the wage, and the optimal taxes in these three economies under the above choice of the parameters' values. 8 In the public human capital investment economy and full information economy, the optimal capital and labor taxes are expressed as a function of the individual component of optimal allocation (c, i, k, l) and prices it implies
9 All results presented in this section remain valid across all other parameterizations of our model we considered. We observe that the spread of period-1 consumption, the intertemporal wedge, and the volatility of wealth taxes increase with the degree of private information. In the full information economy, the incentive problem is absent so at the optimum there is no spread of period-1 consumption, no intertemporal wedge, and the marginal optimal wealth taxes are zero. With private information, incentives require a spread in consumption and a positive intertemporal wedge. This wedge increases across environments as more choice variables become private. This translates into a larger and larger spread of the optimal marginal tax rates on capital.
We also observe that more private information leads to less human capital investment. As the incentive problem becomes more severe, the incentive cost of human capital investment increases. Therefore, at the optimum, there is less human capital investment in the economy with more private information.
The asset return wedge is much smaller in the economy with public human capital investment relative to the economy in which human capital investment is private. Intuitively, when human capital investment is private information in addition to human capital, the incentive problem is more severe and the constraint optimal allocation is more inefficient relative to the full insurance (first best) allocation at which the returns on all assets are equal. This relative inefficiency translates into a larger human capital premium.
Conclusion
Our analysis of the optimal taxation problem in a Mirrlees economy with endogenous, risky and private human capital shows the following: (1) It is possible to implement the optimum with a capital and labor income tax system in which capital taxes are linear in capital and labor income taxes depend only on labor income. (2) Endogenous skill determination does not affect the average optimal capital tax rate, which continues to be equal to zero. Instead, as we show both numerically and analytically, it increases the volatility of optimal marginal capital tax rates. (3) It is optimal for the return on human capital investment to be strictly larger than the return on physical capital investment.
In this paper, we study a two-period environment. An extension of our model to a general dynamic Mirrlees economy is not straightforward for two reasons. First, in a multiperiod setting, human capital becomes a hidden state variable that evolves stochastically over time, presumably with persistence. In general, optimal allocations are very difficult to characterize in such environments. Second, as our analysis of the two-period model shows, when intertemporal marginal rates of substitution are private, a simple invocation of incentive compatibility of the optimal allocation is not sufficient to ensure the incentive compatibility of the market mechanism in a fiscal decentralization. In particular, some of the off-equilibrium strategies available to agents in the market mechanism provide strictly more utility than their counterparts in the direct revelation mechanism, in which the optimal allocation is determined. A general method for finding the values that these off-equilibrium strategies attain in the market mechanism is not presently available. An extension of our model to an environment with a more complicated temporal and stochastic structure would involve a computation of values of very many off-equilibrium strategies, which would quickly become intractable.
Appendix Proof of Lemma 1
Necessity If allocation (c, i, k 1 , l, K, Y ) is IC, then (11) must hold. If it did not, then the strategy of investing i and providing f (i)l(1) units of effective labor irrespectively of θ would yield more utility to the agent than the truthful investment/revelation strategy of investing the recommended amount i and providing f (θ)l(θ) units of effective labor in state θ, which would violate the incentive compatibility of (c, i, k 1 , l, K, Y ).
If allocation (c, i, k 1 , l, K, Y ) is IC, then (13) must hold. If it did not, the strategy of investing e i and providing f (0)l(0) units of effective labor irrespectively of θ would yield more utility to the agent than the truthful investment/revelation strategy, which would violate the incentive compatibility of
is IC, then (12) must hold. If it did not, then there would be an i 0 6 = i such that the strategy of investing i 0 and providing f (θ)l(θ) units of effective labor in state θ would yield more utility to the agent than the truthful investment/revelation strategy, and this would violate the incentive compatibility of (c, i, k 1 , l, K, Y ). Sufficiency Note that since w(0, i 0 ) does not depend on i 0 , we can write function V given in (7) as βπ (1)
Under (11), we have w(0, i 0 ) = u(c 1 (0)) + v(l(0)). Thus, an allocation (c, i, k 1 , l, K, Y ) that satisfies (11) is incentive compatible (satisfies the IC constraint (6)) if and only is it satisfies the following condition
Exchanging the order of max operations, we get the following equivalent expression of the IC condition:
This constraint, in turn, is satisfied if and only if the following two constraints are satisfied:
The expressions under the max operator on the right-hand sides of (43) and ( (44) are identical when i 0 is equal to i. ¤
Proof of Lemma 2
We prove this lemma in a series of steps. In
Step 1, we show that the constraint (12) does not bind in problem P2. Then, in
Step 2, we show that the ex ante IC condition (13) binds in P2. Finally, in
Step 3, we show that constraint (11) does not bind in problem P2.
Step 1 We prove that constraint (12) does not bind in problem P2 by considering a relaxed version of problem P2 in which (12) is dropped. We then show that the solution to the relaxed problem satisfies (12).
Consider a relaxed version of problem P2 in which (12) is dropped. Due to the assumed strict convexity of preferences, this problem P2 has a unique solution. Due to the Inada conditions, this solution is interior. The Lagrangian of this relaxed problem is
where e i is a function of c 0 , i, l(0) given implicitly by
and where α, µ, λ 0 , and λ 1 are the Lagrange multipliers of the respective constraints. Taking the FO conditions of this Lagrangian with respect to c 0 , i, l(0), by the Envelope Theorem, the terms that involve the derivative d e i/dx drop out. The FO conditions for the unique interior solution to the relaxed planner problem P2, then, are as follows:
In order to show that (12) does not bind in the unrelaxed planner's problem P1, it is sufficient to show that the solution to the relaxed problem P2 satisfies (12). Indeed, combining (46) with (49) yields
The FO condition (52) implies
Combining the above two equations yields
which is condition (12). Hence, condition (12) does not bind at the optimum.
Step 2 We prove by contradiction that, in problem P2, the ex ante IC condition (13) binds. If (13) does not bind in P2, then the solution to a relaxed problem P2 in which (13) is dropped must satisfy (13). We show that if (13) is dropped from P2, then, taking into account that (12) does not bind, the full insurance allocation (sometimes also called the first best allocation) solves that problem. But full insurance violates (13), hence (13) must bind.
From
Step 1, we know that the optimal allocation is a unique interior solution of the relaxed problem P2 which is formed from P1 by dropping the constraint (12). Suppose that at the constrained optimal allocation (c
, the ex-ante IC constraint (13) is not binding.
Consider the full insurance allocation (sometimes also called the first best allocation), which is the unique resource feasible allocation that satisfies c 1 (0) = c 1 (1) (full insurance of consumption) and
Denote the full insurance allocation by (c fi , k
If the incentive compatibility condition (11) does not bind at the solution to P2, i.e., if its Lagrange multiplier α = 0, we check directly that the full insurance allocation satisfies the FO conditions of P2, (46) )). This, combined with the fact that the full insurance allocation is resource feasible, implies that the full insurance allocation is the unique solution to the planner's problem P2 when the constraint (13) is not binding. However, this yields a contradiction as the the full insurance allocation does not satisfy the constraint (13). To see this, note that the fact that e i maximizes the right-hand side of (43) implies that
Therefore, for an allocation to satisfy (13), it is necessary that constraint (13) implies that at the incentive compatible allocation
But, using (57), we get that
which implies that the full insurance allocation violates (58), and thus it also violates the IC constraint (13). Therefore, we conclude, the ex ante IC constraint (13) must bind at the solution to P2.
Step 3 We prove that constraint (11) does not bind in problem P2 as follows. First, in Step 3a, we show that any incentive feasible allocation that satisfies both (11) and (13) as equalities is a so-called bunching allocation at which both ex post types of agents provide the same amount of effective labor and consume equal amounts of the consumption good. Then, in Step 3b, we show that the bunching allocation does not solve P2. This means that at least one of these two constraints, (11) and (13), is slack at the solution to P2. By Step 2, (13) binds. Thus, constraint (11) must be slack at the optimum.
Step 3a If (13) and (11) both bind in problem P2, then, by complementary slackness, they must both be satisfied as equalities. We first show that any incentive feasible allocation that satisfies both (13) and (11) as equalities is a so-called bunching allocation. Then, we show that a bunching allocation can never be optimal.
If (11) holds as equality, then, as u is strictly increasing and v is strictly decreasing, three cases are possible:
Case 1. We have that (11) holding as equality, c 1 (0) > c 1 (1), and f (0)l(0) > f(i)l(1) imply that for any i 0 > 0
In particular, for i 0 = i we get
Because e i satisfies (14), i.e., maximizes the value of the deviation strategy of announcing θ = 0 when θ = 1, we have
The last two inequalities put together contradict (13).
Case 2. We have that (11) holding as equality, c 1 (0) < c 1 (1), and f (0)l(0) < f(i)l(1) imply that for any i 0 > 0
In particular, for i 0 = e i we get
Combining the above strict inequality with (13) holding with equality and subtracting βπ(1)u(c 1 (1)) from both sides, we get
, which contradicts the assumption that i satisfies (12). (12) and (14) imply that e i = i. Condition (13) reduces then to
Both this condition and (11) are (trivially) satisfied with equality because c 1 (0) = c 1 (1) and
We have thus shown that if an allocation satisfies both (13) and (11) as equalities, then c 1 (0) = c 1 (1) and f (0)l(0) = f (i)l(1). We will refer to any such allocation as a bunching allocation and denote it by (c
Step 3b Now we show that no bunching allocation is optimal. If a bunching allocation is not resource feasible, we are done. Suppose then it is RF. And suppose it is optimal. Then, there must exist Lagrange multipliers α, µ, λ 0 , λ 1 , such that the bunching allocation (c
satisfies the FO conditions (46) through (52). In addition, under the assumption that (13) and (11) bind, all those Lagrange multipliers must be strictly positive. The FO conditions (47) and (48) (59), we can write the FO conditions (51) and (52) as
βv 0 (l(1))
Substituting (60) into (61) and cancelling out terms, we get the following condition:
,
is strictly increasing in i, is a contradiction. We have shown in Step 3b that no bunching allocation (c
is constrained optimal. We have also shown in Step 3a that there is no non-bunching allocation that satisfies both (11) and (13) as equalities. Therefore, it is not true that at the solution to P2 both IC constraints (11) and (13) bind. By
Step 2, (13) does bind. Thus, (11) does not. ¤
Proof of Proposition 1
To obtain (21), we combine the FO conditions ( 
Combining (62) and (63) we get
The first order conditions (46) and (49) of the planner's problem imply that
33
Substituting this into (66) yields
The first order conditions (46) and (65) .
In order to confirm the formula for α given in (22), we use (63) to eliminate R * from (62) .
¤

Proof of Proposition 2
Condition (31) follows directly from (66). ¤
Proof of Proposition 3
In order to show that the tax system (τ * , φ * ) is optimal, we need to show that if taxes are (τ * , φ * ), then the optimal allocation (c * , k * 1 , i * , l * , K * , Y * ) is an equilibrium allocation.
We claim that it indeed is under equilibrium prices r and w given by the optimal marginal returns r * and w * , respectively.
First, as the optimal allocation (c * , k
We check directly that the optimal consumption levels c * 0 , c * 1 (0), c * 1 (1) satisfy the first FO condition. That c * 0 and i * solve the second FO condition follows from the fact that the optimal allocation satisfies (12). Since the optimal allocation is resource feasible, it satisfies the ex ante budget constraint. Finally, we check directly that c * 1 (0), c * 1 (1) and k * 1 satisfy the ex post budget constraints for both θ. By strict concavity of the objective, (c * 0 , c * 1 (0), c * 1 (1), i * , k * 1 ) is the unique solution to the utility maximization problem under effective labor supply strategy 1, prices (r * , w * ) and taxes (τ * , φ * ).
Using the identity f (θi * )l * (θ)/f (θi) = l * (θ), we get that the maximal utility attained under strategy 1 is equal to u(c * 0 ) + β X θ∈Θ [π(θ)u(c * 1 (θ)) + v(l * (θ))] .
We have thus shown that, under taxes (τ * , φ * ) and prices (r * , w * ), the individually optimal choices of investment, consumption and labor coincide with the individual component of the optimal allocation (c
Proof of Proposition 4
Using the (37)-(39) expressions for optimal taxes, we get .
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The FOC (47) and (48) 
Substituting (74) into (73) (1 + α)r * βu 0 (c * 1 (1))
.
Using (22) to eliminate α from the denominator of (75), we get
where the last inequality follows directly from our modified Rogerson equation (21). By the zero expected tax result shown above, in order to establish that τ * (0) > 0 > τ * (1), all we need to show is 1 − τ * (0) < 1 − τ * (1). The fact that i * > e i * gives us the following double inequality: 
Proof of Proposition 5
Given that the expected marginal tax rate is zero both in the exogenous and in the endogenous skill model, it is enough to show that 1 − τ * (0) < 1 −τ (0). First, we show that r * >r. Using (in this order) the modified Rogerson condition (21), the facts that i * > e i * and α > 0, the assumption c = c * , and the standard Rogerson condition (42), we get 
